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Introduction
An interesting phenomenon of plant viral disease, which is not so common among complex since encapsidation of GRV in the GRAV capsid proteins requires of the intervention of a GRV satellite RNA that co-encapsidates [13] .
In mixed infections, each viral population changes the environment and becomes part of the fitness landscape of the co-infecting virus population. Therefore, in mixed infections the success of any virus depends not only on its adaptation to the host, but also on how its behavior interacts with that of others. So the fitness of an individual virus cannot be measured in isolation; rather it has to be evaluated in the context of the community in which it lives. This opens the door to a natural game-theoretic analogy:
genetically-determined characteristics and behaviors of a virus are like its strategy in a game, its fitness is like its payoff, and this payoff depends on the strategies of the viruses with which it interacts. Biological games can be conveniently modeled and analyzed using the mathematical framework provided by game theory [14, 15 * 
The payoff matrix
In the simplest situation, two players can chose between two strategies, cooperation or defection. Viral cooperation and defection can be defined as, respectively, the manufacturing and sequestering of diffusible (shared) intracellular products ( Figure 1 ).
The 2×2 payoff matrix shown in Table 1 is the fundamental tool to analyze and predict the outcome of the contest. Each player has a different fitness depending on the frequency of competitors in the population. The entries denote the payoff for the row player. If player A decides to cooperate, its fitness would depend on player B's response. If B cooperates, then both players receive a fitness reward R for their mutual cooperation. However, if B decides to defect, A suffers a reduction in fitness S (the sucker's payoff). Lets turn now to the situation in which A decides to defect. If B still cooperates, then A gets an additional fitness bonus T (the temptation of defect). Finally, if both players decide to defect, they both suffer a fitness punishment P.
In a well-mixed population (i.e., no spatial structure exists in the system and thus all encounters are equally likely to happen), there are four possible outcomes, depending on the relative values of the four elements of the payoff matrix [16, 17] . (i) If R > T and S > P, then no conflict exists and mutual cooperation (MC) is the dominant strategy.
Indeed, this solution provides a single stable equilibrium in which both populations coexist.
(ii) If parameters satisfy the condition R < T and S < P, then mutual defection is the dominant strategy, which also corresponds to a stable equilibrium in which, in the long term, only one of the populations persists. This game corresponds to the famous Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). (iii) If R > T and S < P, then both contenders will benefit when acquiring the same strategy (mutual cooperation or mutual defection), but will suffer punishment when choosing a strategy different from that of their counterpart.
This game is known as the Stag-Hunt (SH) and gives rise to two symmetric non-stable equilibria, thus representing a potential problem as populations may get trapped in the suboptimal mutual defection equilibrium. Finally, (iv) if parameter values are such that R < T and S > P, we are in the domain of the Hawk-Dove game (HD). In this game cooperation is better only when the other player defects and vice versa, defection is better when the opponent cooperates. The stable equilibrium for this game is to adopt a strategy different from that of the other player.
Last, another concept to keep in mind is that of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS).
Maynard Smith [19] defined a population as evolutionary stable if it is resistant to
invasion by a small group of individuals playing a different game. Put in other words:
if a virus were genetically determined to cooperate, would it persist in the presence of another virus that is defecting? The mathematical conditions for ESS are that R > T or that R = T and S > P. Thus cooperation is an ESS in MC and SH games.
Common games among plant viruses
Available data are scarce to properly address whether plant viruses may prefer one strategy to another. Yet, Table 2 shows the results from the analyses of payoff matrices constructed for a set of 25 viruses, from 10 genera (including both DNA and RNA genomes), in 18 pairwise combinations. Regardless the nature of the viruses involved in the pair, MC is the most commonly played game. This game represents the case of perfect synergism in which both competitors benefit from each other. Since MC is an ESS, two viruses involved in this game will coexist in the infected plant for long periods of time. The second most commonly played game is HD. According to this game, both viruses compete for a limiting resource. If one competitor is better using a given resource than the other, then it gets full benefit; but if both competitors are equally fit, they negatively affect each other. Intuitively, a hawk will do very well in a population of doves -but in a population of all hawks, a dove will actually do better by staying out of the way while the hawks fight with each other. HD is not an ESS, meaning that two viruses cannot persist together for long, as one will ultimately outcompete the other. Table 2 suggests some other interesting things that need to be explored in the future. 
Games are grounded in molecular interactions
One of the best-studied mechanisms of synergism is via the blockage of the RNA silencing antiviral response by viral suppressors of RNA silencing (VSR) [34-37 ** ]
( Figure 1 ). For example, potyvirus SPFMV and crinivirus SPCSV are mostly involved in HD games, which is not ESS ( 
Conclusions
Simple viruses exhibit surprisingly complex behaviors during competition. In each case, evolutionary game theory sheds light on the exact mechanism by which interaction takes place. From an academic perspective, more systematic data will allow to explore the reproducibility of the games, to analyze whether certain viral genera have a tendency to play a given game, and to explore the influence of host species, of other environmental factor, and of plant developmental stages on the games played by viral contenders. Experiments must be designed keeping in mind the sort of information needed to construct payoff matrices. And a further step will be to analyze multi-player (> 2) games.
From a more practical perspective, evolutionary game theory may contribute to better understand the foundations of cross-protection. Cross-protection describes the phenomenon by which infection with a mild strain protects against subsequent infection from a severe one of a closely related virus [1, 44] . Genetically modified plants do not perform as well as expected against viral infections. Therefore, the usage of coinfecting viruses to cross-protect seems a reasonable strategy worth exploring. Table 1 The payoff matrix for the interaction between two players
Type of adversary (B)
Cooperator Defector
Player who wins the payoff (A) Cooperator R S
Defector

T P
The standard scaled parameterization entails designing R = 1 and P = 0 as fixed [18] . While mostly cooperative, and shown here as independent for the purp simplification, these interactions may be antagonistic in some cases and may be interconnected.
